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Abstract 
The growing recognition of disruptive innovation as an important phenomenon in 
competitive strategy has led researchers to examine the question of how to promote 
disruptive innovation. The extant literature has studied on the organisational preconditions for 
disruptive innovation to arise, including resource allocation processes, organisational 
structure, organisational culture, and R&D and production processes. Much less attention has 
been paid to the role of customer-oriented processes in enabling disruptive innovation. In this 
research we develop propositions about how customer-oriented processes can foster 
disruptive innovation by using a set of case studies of Chinese firms. These findings have 
important implications for firms wishing to fuel disruptive innovations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A substantial body of research, built since 1980s, has examined the important 
phenomenon of disruptive innovation (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Adner, 2002, 2006; 
Bettencourt & Ulwick, 2008; Christensen, 2006; Christensen & Bower, 1996; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003; Danneels, 2004; Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006; Hall, Matos, & Martin, 2014; 
Linton, 2002, 2004, 2009). The growing recognition of disruptive innovation as an important 
phenomenon in competitive strategy has led researchers to examine the question of how 
disruptive innovation comes about. Earlier research has explored the conditions under which 
disruptive innovation is likely to arise from an organization, including its resource allocation 
processes (Chao & Kavadias, 2007; Hogan, 2005; Nelson & Winter, 1982); its organisational 
structure (Cohen & Klepper, 1996; Lee & Chen, 2009; Tsai & Wang, 2005); its 
organisational culture (Henderson, 2006; Tushman & O'Reilly, 2002); and R&D and 
production processes (Wan, Williaomson, & Yin, 2015).  
Despite the progress, the nature of customer-orientation processes that promote 
disruptive innovation deserves further examination (Yu & Hang, 2010), as the key to 
facilitate disruptive innovation is a deep understanding potential customers' latent needs. 
Unless established companies’ accumulated capabilities are rendered obsolete by a 
technological discontinuity, the main reason why incumbents fail to recognise and adequately 
respond to disruptive innovation lies in their failure to link technological advances to changes 
in consumer needs or market conditions, as described by Christensen (1997) in the case of 
disk drives. However, the extant literature lacks detailed studies elaborating on the customer-
oriented processes used to identify latent customer needs and enable potential disruptive 
innovation (Yu & Hang, 2010).  
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In seeking to better understand these processes we have chosen to focus on the 
processes by which disruptive innovations arise in an emerging market: China. This choice 
reflects the growing body of evidence that suggests emerging economies are becoming an 
important source of disruptive innovation (Hart & Christensen, 2002; Li, 2013; Williamson & 
Yin, 2013). Emerging market environments can stimulate disruptive innovation because 
changes to product design and business models that drastically lower costs and improve value 
for money are often a prerequisite for unlocking mass-market segments of customers with 
limited disposable income in these economies. Large numbers of first-time consumers with 
less established preferences and expectations, less regulation, and fewer legacy assets may 
also mean it is possible to launch, test and improve disruptive innovations more rapidly and 
cheaply than in developed markets (Williamson, Ramamurti, Fleury & Fleury, 2013). 
Arguably the predominate source of disruptive innovations among emerging markets has 
been China where examples span a wide variety of industries from medical diagnostic 
equipment and lithium-ion batteries through to innovative business models for e-commerce 
and social media portals (Williamson & Yin, 2013). With the aim of better understanding 
how customer-oriented processes can act as antecedents for disruptive innovation, in this 
paper we have chosen to analyse a set of case studies of Chinese firms pursuing potentially 
disruptive innovation and then to explore some of the implications of these innovations for 
incumbent competitors from the developed markets. 
Synthesising the findings from these case studies suggests a number of mechanisms 
by which latent needs can be uncovered and utilised to fuel disruptive innovation: first, by 
establishing joint labs with lead customers; second, inviting members of customers’ to the 
potential supplier’s own R&D; and third, that collaborating with customers via Internet. 
The main contribution of this paper is to understand how customer-oriented processes 
can enable potential disruptive innovation in the disruptive innovation literature. We also 
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seek to extend the user innovation literature (de Jong & von Hippel, 2009; Urban & von 
Hippel, 1988; von Hippel, 1976, 1978, 1986, 1994) by examining how customer-oriented 
processes may strengthen the link between users and organizations. The user innovation 
literature claims a direct link from interaction with customers and users to innovation 
performance. However such links may not be effective for knowledge sharing and innovation 
when the contact with customers or users is with, for example, their key-account managers or 
through the customer’s procurement department. This warrants more in-depth examination of 
various customer-oriented processes. 
The paper is structured as follows. We begin by examining the existing literature on 
theories of disruptive innovation and user innovation. This leads us to identify a gap in our 
existing understanding about how customer-oriented processes might give rise to disruptive 
innovation and some broad conjectures about what kinds of customer-focused processes 
might promote disruptive innovation. The next section on methods and data explains the case 
study methodology we deploy to explore these issues and conjectures and how data were 
collected and analysed to develop a set of propositions about the antecedents of disruptive 
innovation. We then report findings from the case studies of Chinese firms, and followed by a 
discussion of the implications for the changing nature of global competition. We conclude by 
outlining the possible contributions of the present study to existing theory and practice. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The theory of disruptive innovation provides the context for interpreting the empirical 
results and theoretical contributions of this study. In this section we bring together insights 
from two streams of literature: disruptive innovation and user-centric innovation, each of 
which we review in turn. This leads us to identify a gap in the literature which gives rise to 
the research question addressed in the remainder of this paper: how to promote potential 
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disruptive innovation by using customer-oriented processes. 
 
Theoretical insights into disruptive innovation  
The concept of disruptive innovation goes back at least to the seminal work by 
Abernathy and Clark (1985), who suggested that disruptive innovation often destroyed the 
value of existing technical competencies. Christensen (1997) was the first scholar who 
comprehensively examined the concept of disruptive innovation in his influential book titled 
The Innovator's Dilemma. The book investigates why great companies often suffer from 
market myopia and are overtaken by entrant firms introducing products based on new, 
disruptive technologies.  
To explain this phenomenon, Christensen (1997) distinguishes between sustaining and 
disruptive technologies. Sustaining technologies respond to an improvement, radical or 
incremental of established products along the dimensions of performance that main-stream 
customers in major markets have valued. In contrast disruptive technologies are technologies 
that was initially inferior in terms of the performance criteria preferred by mainstream 
customers but met the needs of emerging customers in new ways and improved over time to 
the point of satisfying mainstream customers. Such a market disruption is contingent on two 
preconditions: (1) the performance of the mainstream attributes of the existing product is 
overshoot; and (2) asymmetric incentives exist between an extant healthy business model and 
the potentially disruptive business model. Examples of these disruptive phenomena include 
hard disk drives, personal computers and motor controls.  
How can incumbent firms respond to disruptive innovators? Christensen and Raynor 
(2003) published another influential book, The Innovator's Solution, which proposed that the 
innovator's dilemma could be resolved if well-managed incumbent firms developed their own 
disruptive technologies within their sustaining innovation paradigms. By adopting this 
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strategy they could avoid their own dethronement when facing the challenges from disruptive 
innovators. Interestingly in this second book the authors replaced the term “disruptive 
technology” with a new term “disruptive innovation”, suggesting the application of the theory 
could be broadened to include not only technological products, but also services and business 
models innovation, such as discount department stores, low-price, point-to-point airlines and 
online businesses education. Christensen (2006) admitted that he had been mistaken to equate 
the phenomenon of disruptive innovation with a disruptive technology in The Innovator's 
Dilemma. Disruptive innovation does not only arise from new technologies that destroy the 
value of the existing technologies dominant in a market, but also arise from changes in the 
business model or underlying processes that enable superior or novel value to be delivered to 
consumers.  
Markides (2006) further clarified the concept and drew a clear distinction between 
different kinds of disruptive innovations: technological, business model, and radical product 
innovations. He suggested that all of these different types of disruptive innovations may 
follow a similar path to attack existing markets and may have equally disruptive effects on 
incumbent firms. But a disruptive technological innovation is a fundamentally different 
phenomenon from a disruptive business-model innovation or a disruptive product innovation. 
These innovations arise in different ways, have different competitive effects, and require 
different responses from incumbents. To distinguish disruptive innovation from other types of 
innovations, Markides (2012) proposed two criteria: first, a disruptive innovation must start 
out as inferior in terms of the performance that existing customers expect, but be superior in 
terms of price; second, it must evolve so as to become "good enough" in performance while 
at the same time remaining superior in price. These criteria reflect the idea that a disruptive 
innovation challenges the established value propositions and business models of incumbents. 
We emphasise that one of the key insights from this analysis is that innovations do not 
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need to need to embody radical advances in either technology or product functionality in 
order to be disruptive. There is a clear distinction between innovations that are disruptive and 
merely radical - radicalness is a technology-based concept while disruptiveness is a market-
based concept. In fact, many innovations that might otherwise be described as “imitative” 
(Huang, Chou & Lee, 2010) can be disruptive because they challenge the existing value 
propositions and business models in the market. 
Drawing on these insights, Yin and Williamson (2009) studied different types of 
disruptive innovations that have been introduced by Chinese firms. The authors found that 
these innovations can be disaggregated into three categories within their samples. First was 
“cost innovation” (e.g. the Huawei case in this research): reengineering the cost structure in 
novel ways to offer customers adequate quality and similar or higher value for less cost (Zeng 
& Williamson, 2007). Second was “application innovation” (e.g. the Kingdee case): finding 
innovative applications for existing technologies or products (Yu & Hang, 2011). Third was 
“business model innovation” (e.g. the Xiaomi case): the well-worn idea of changing one of 
the four core components of the business model (customer value proposition, profit formula, 
key resources or new processes) but with a twist - adjusting those aspects that can be changed 
quickly and at minimal cost. All of these three types of innovation can be considered 
disruptive in the sense that they attack performance overshoots on the mainstream attributes 
of an existing product while also have proved to be disruptive in the market. 
 
Enabling potential disruptive innovation from the customer perspective 
Building on the research that established the concept of disruptive innovation and 
developed a more complete typology of disruptive innovations, a substantial body of 
literature has elaborated on how to enable disruptive innovation from an organization, 
including its resource allocation processes (Chao & Kavadias, 2007; Hogan, 2005; Nelson & 
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Winter, 1982); its organisational structure (Cohen & Klepper, 1996; Lee & Chen, 2009; Tsai 
& Wang, 2005); its organisational culture (Henderson, 2006; Tushman & O'Reilly, 2002); 
and R&D and production processes (Wan et al., 2015).  
Earlier research has also examined customer orientation under disruptive changes to 
some extent, which attempted to seek answers from the customer’s perspective (Yu & Hang, 
2010). A firm's customer oriented process is a form of search to understand the needs of 
customers (Govindarajan, Kopalle, & Danneels, 2011). The notion of search goes back at 
least to the seminal work by Cyert and March (1963), and is further elaborated in 
organizational theory (Starbuck, 1976; Thompson, 1967), explaining search is a relationship 
between the organization and its environment. 
It is widely recognized that enabling disruptive innovation requires deeply 
understanding the customers' latest needs (Yu & Hang, 2010). Excepting the case where a 
technological discontinuity obsoletes the capabilities incumbents have accumulated, the most 
common case of difficulty with disruptive innovation is failure to properly link the 
development of technological advances to changes in the marketplace, changes in consumer 
needs or market conditions. Customer orientation involves finding potential customers, 
constructing relationships with them, and developing knowledge about them (Danneels, 2002, 
2004). Govindarajan, Kopalle and Danneels (2011) indicated that emerging customer 
orientation is positively related to disruptive innovation, because companies with high 
emerging customer orientation develop products for alternative customers, rather than their 
current customers. 
In sum, the above analysis highlights the criticality of deeply understanding the 
customers’ latent needs because a firm’s inability to find new markets for new technologies 
seems likely to be its most serious innovation handicap (Christensen and Bower 1996). 
However, the question of how a firm deeply understand the latent customers’ needs and 
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recognises the market potential of new technologies remains. More specifically, the question 
of what customer-oriented processes a firm needs to adopt in order to understand how 
customers behave (rather than simply how they say they will behave) deserves further 
examination.  
 
User innovation 
 A related research stream on customer orientation is user innovation theory. It has 
long been recognised in the user innovation literature that interaction with customers and 
users can promote innovation (Freeman, 1968; Lauren & Salter, 2006; Smith, 1776/1999; von 
Hippel, 1976). The importance of users during innovation of the products has been the 
subject of research since at least Adam Smith (1776/1999), who reported that it was a boy (a 
user) that first made improvement to the valve of fire-engines so that the valve would open 
and shut without his assistance to leave him at liberty to play with his fellows. More recently 
in the 1960s, several scholars (Enos, 1962; Freeman, 1968; Hollander, 1965) provided further 
evidence that users can innovate. Von Hippel was the first scholar who explicitly paid 
attention to the central role of users as innovators in his seminal paper (von Hippel, 1976), 
suggesting approximately 80% of innovations in the scientific instrument innovation process 
were invented, prototyped, and first field-tested by users of the instrument. This seminal work 
intrigued a large amount of research examining users as the sources of innovation. Studies 
that show users as the sources of innovation include industries as diverse as industrial 
machinery (Foxall & Tierney, 1984), application software (Voss, 1985), semiconductors 
(Von Hippel, 1988), and machine tools (Lee, 1996). 
 In this study, we focus on how producers/firms can leverage the interaction with users 
to increase innovation performance. In this research stream, von Hippel and colleagues focus 
on CAP ("customer-active paradigm") and lead users. von Hippel (1978) developed the 
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concept of CAP in which the user initiates the new product idea and then transfers it to an 
interested producer (de Jong & von Hippel, 2009). He suggested that the CAP is more 
appropriate to the industrial innovation process than "manufacturing-active paradigm", as 
ideas for most new industrial products are generated by users. A more proactive way to 
involve users in producers' innovation processes is by involving lead users, who sense needs 
at an earlier time than other users and also are likely to benefit considerably if a solution is 
achieved. This part of the user innovation literature takes this interaction as the unit of 
analysis and examines, for example, how cooperation improves both the capacity of the 
customer firm to transmit the knowledge that may be useful in the innovation process and the 
capacity of the established firm to absorb it. Producers can work with lead users to develop 
breakthrough products that tend to have higher performance and market potential than other 
innovations (Luthje & Herstatt, 2004; Von Hippel, 2005).  
 The implicit assumption of the user innovation literature, however, is that there is a 
direct link from interaction with customers and users to innovation performance (Foss, 
Laursen, & Pedersen, 2011). Such link may indeed exist, when, for example, the R&D 
engineers in an organization have established a reliable communication channel with users to 
deeply understand their latent needs. But a direct link between organizations and users may 
not exist if the contacts with customers are with the account managers. In this case the 
organizations would be difficult to absorb accurate knowledge from users to facilitate their 
innovations. Hence the question of how to establish and maintain a direct and reliable link 
between organizations and customers therefore deserves further studies.  
To sum up, although it has long been known that customers' knowledge is important 
in promoting potential disruptive innovation, the extant literature on how customer-oriented 
processes establish a direct link between customers and the organization and impact the 
extent of disruptive innovation even when preconditions are favourable, is scarce. Drawing 
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on the evidence from Chinese firms, we hope to contribute to filling this gap by specifically 
exploring the customer-oriented processes that can enable firms to promote, and then deliver 
on, opportunities for disruptive innovation in the context of China.  
 
METHODS AND DATA 
 As we have already noted, evidence suggests that China is becoming an important 
source of disruptive innovation (Hart & Christensen, 2002; Li, 2013; Williamson & Yin, 
2013). Existing research also suggests a number of factors that encourage Chinese firms to 
focus on disruptive innovation including a lower number of legacy customers, a relatively 
small installed base compared with the potential future size of their domestic market, intense 
pressure to make a step-change improvement in value for money to unlock the Chinese mass 
market, low income levels of the majority of Chinese consumers encouraging focus on “good 
enough” or “sufficient” product performance on key attributes, shortage of capital invest and 
lack of experience in traditional R&D focused on higher performance and extended 
functionality (Zeng & Williamson, 2007). The study of Chinese firms is therefore a 
potentially fertile ground for examining what customer-oriented processes can be deployed to 
deeply understand customers' needs and convert these opportunities and demands into 
disruptive innovations. 
 In seeking to answer this question we rely on inductive theory building using case 
study. The adoption of this approach is largely a function of the research questions that we 
are interested in. The case study has a distinct advantage in addressing “how” and “why” 
questions (Yin, 2003), and can “investigate a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within 
its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident” (Yin, 2003). A case study can serve as "a talking pig" to allow a reader to see 
the world, and not just the literature, in a new way (Siggelkow, 2007). Case studies, like 
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experiments, can be generalised to form theoretical propositions. The goal of adopting the 
explanatory case study research to test theory is to expand and generalise theories (analytic 
generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation). 
We chose multiple case study methodology because it has proven particularly 
effective in developing new theory from consistent patterns within case data using replication 
logic in which each case serving to confirm (or disconfirm) the emergent theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Martin, 2011). Moreover, multiple case studies are more likely to yield more 
generalized, robust, and parsimonious theory than single-case studies (Langley, 1999; Yin, 
2003).  
 
Data Collection  
 We conducted a field study using observations, interviews, and archival data such as 
internal documents, annual reports, websites, and news articles in order to triangulate the data 
and so improve the accuracy of the picture emerging (Jick, 1979). Research sites were 
selected to achieve a diverse sample to enable richer theory development (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). We aimed to analyse a sufficient number of case studies and 
range of industries to be fairly confident that the results had some general applicability while 
limiting the sample so as to enable in-depth interviews within a tractable timescale. Based on 
these considerations we targeted completion of 4-10 case studies. We gained access to the 
first hand data in the three industries through several ways. For example, the first author has 
worked in the Chinese enterprise management software industry for several years, which 
allowed us to observe daily business in the industry in depth and to collect rich first hand data. 
We managed to access other case firms through friends and contacts. For example, a close 
friend of the author was working with Huawei as a R&D director based in Beijing. Another 
close friend was working with SANY as a product manager in Beijing.  
By the end of the research programme we were successful in conducting two rounds 
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of interviews across 6 companies (detailed in Table 1). The first round of interviews was 
conducted between September 2013 and March 2014 and a second round between July 2014 
and October 2014. The second round of interviews complemented the first by asking follow-
up and clarification questions. In some cases were we were able to secure interviews with 
multiple individuals; here we tried to gain perspectives from employees drawn from different 
levels in the corporate hierarchy or multiple business units, making a total of 39 semi-
structured interviews. We started the interviews by asking background questions such as the 
name of the informant, their role in their firm, and how many years have he/she worked with 
their firm. We encouraged informants to provide more details when their descriptions were 
brief or when novel strands of narrative emerged (Martin & Eisenhardt, 2010; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). Data collection stopped when theoretical saturation was reached (Strauss, 
1987). Data about customer-oriented processes were compared and integrated across 
informants. Interviews commonly lasted for between 30 minutes to two hours. Interview 
notes were written down immediately after each interview, normally within 24 hours.  
 
Data Analysis 
We used within-case and cross-case analyses following recommendations for multiple 
case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1994). We started by writing up 
individual cases that triangulated all of our data including observations, interviews, 
documents (Jick, 1979). The importance of within-case analysis is driven by one of the 
realities of case study research - an overwhelming volume of data. We began within-case 
analysis in which customer-oriented process was the unit of analysis, developing preliminary 
concepts and a rough theoretical explanation for the preconditions of disruptive innovation. 
Detailed individual case write-ups for each site gave us a deep familiarity with each case 
which, in turn, accelerated cross-case comparison.   
After that we conducted a cross-case analysis using replication logic across firms, 
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treating each firm as a case. The pattern of "establishing joint labs with customers", for 
example, emerged in this analysis phase. During the cross-case analysis we probed for 
alternative theoretical relationships and constructs that might fit the data better than our initial 
emergent theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gilbert, 2005). We also used tables and graphs to refine 
the constructs and theoretical relationships (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Some of novel 
conceptual constructs and new theoretical relationships were revised or deleted if we found 
they did not replicate across the cases. Using replication logic, we stopped data analysis until 
we reached a strong match between emergent theory and the empirical data. 
 
CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
Even if established companies are able to develop new technological capabilities, they 
can fail to link the development of such technological advances to disruptive changes in the 
marketplace, in consumer needs or market conditions. Thus we argue that deeply 
understanding the customers' latent needs or and recognising the associate market potential  
are key enablers for  disruptive innovation. The ways to understand how customers behave 
(rather than simply how they say they will behave) that we found underpinning the disruptive 
innovation in our case studies included: establishing joint labs with customers, adding 
customers as key members of the R&D team, and involving customers in the R&D processes 
through Internet. During our investigations in China we came across many firms that did not 
fully understand how customers behave, but rather relied on low factor costs to offer the 
lowest possible prices in a “race to the bottom”. This suggests the firms that deeply 
understand the customers' latent needs to leverage abundant resources and low factor costs 
available in China in novel ways are making a conscious strategic choice to try to gain 
advantage against competitors who also enjoy similar access to abundant and low-cost 
resource pools. The ways in which Chinese companies to deliver different types of disruptive 
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innovations to the market by deeply understanding how customers behave are summarized in 
Table 1. This evidence led us to define the high-level model of the antecedents of customer –
orientated, disruptive innovation. In what follows we detail these relationships. 
 
Establishing joint labs with customers 
Some Chinese firms we studied enabled disruptive innovation by setting up joint 
innovation centres with customers to deeply understand the customers' latent needs and 
developing products meeting the specific needs of customers. Huawei, for example, is a 
Chinese multinational networking and telecommunications equipment and services company 
headquartered in Shenzhen, Guangdong province. It was founded in 1987 as a distributor of 
imported telecoms products with an initial registered capital of merely USD 3,000. The 
company then disrupted the telecoms industry by offering telecommunications equipment to 
operators with adequate functionality and reliability that could be installed rapidly, 
customized easily to local requirements, and serviced remotely all at a lower price than its 
major competitors. This enabled it to become the largest telecommunications equipment 
maker in the world, having overtaken Ericsson in 2012 (Economist, 2012). Its products and 
services have been deployed in more than 140 countries and it currently serves 45 of the 
world's 50 largest telecoms operators. 
In order to deeply understand the customers' needs, Huawei has established joint labs 
with its major clients, including Deutsche Telecom, Vodafone, Telefonica, China Telecom, 
and China Mobile. Those joint labs have released some very successful products and 
solutions. For example, the telecom infrastructure keeps upgrading from 2G, 2.5G, 3G to the 
latest 4G network, which meet different needs of various telecom vendors at different stages. 
However, each upgrade of the network often led vendors to completely redeploy their 
network infrastructure. This is not only time consuming, but also incurs substantial cost. 
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Understanding this market condition, by working with its clients in the joint labs, Huawei 
disrupted the telecom infrastructure industry by introducing their "single network 
infrastructure, single deployment, and single maintenance" (SingleRAN) solution. By using 
the SingleRAN solution, telecom vendors are able to upgrade their networks with only minor 
changes and without replacing their network infrastructure which means upgrade costs are 
lowered dramatically. 
Kingdee (listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange), a leading Chinese ERP 
(Enterprise Resource Planning) software provider, was established in 1993 to develop 
accounting software. At that time SAP and Oracle dominated the Chinese ERP industry. 
Kingdee started to develop ERP system K/3 for SMEs in 1997. By learning from CASE 
(acquired by Kingdee) and Microsoft, the performance of K/3 improved dramatically and it 
became a leading ERP system in China. Kingdee has also been developing a large ERP 
system named EAS (Enterprise Application Suite). Kingdee started to develop EAS in 2003, 
and by 2010 EAS had been implemented in several hundred large Chinese enterprises, many 
of which were listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. By 2008 
Kingdee had released a comprehensive set of ERP systems covering all levels of customers 
with EAS for big enterprises, K/3 for SMEs, and KIS (Keep It Simple) for small enterprises. 
According to the report by CCW1, in 2008 Kingdee was the second biggest ERP supplier 
(next to another Chinese ERP supplier Yonyou) in the Chinese market, surpassing SAP and 
Oracle.   
To understand customers' latent needs, Kingdee established joint innovation centres 
with its major clients, including GREE group (listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange), GNG 
(listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange), and WENS group. The joint innovation centres 
                                                 
1 CCW (China Computer World) report of the Chinese management software sector, 2009. CCW, a joint venture 
magazine between IDG (a leading IT media based in the US) and Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology, 
is a top IT magazine in China. 
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help Kingdee to deeply understand the customers' needs and develop specific products or 
solutions for Chinese companies. One such disruptive product is the Kingdee BOS (Business 
Operating System), which is an ERP software deployment platform that allows Chinese 
companies to customize the ERP application by themselves according to their specific 
management condition. Because each company normally has some unique management 
practices, implementing ERP software is much more than simple installation but involving 
deep customization at high cost (often lasting several years by working with ERP vendors). 
This may not be a problem for established firms in the developed countries, but for many 
emerging Chinese companies with limited capital at their disposal, the high cost of 
implementation of ERP software is a handicap. Understanding this latent need among 
Chinese customers, the Kingdee BOS disrupted the Chinese ERP industry by dramatically 
simplifying the implementation processes and lowered the investment required.  
By establishing joint innovation centres with clients to deeply understand the 
customers' needs, Chinese companies are able to develop the products and processes 
necessary to exploit opportunities for cost, application and business model innovation at 
much lower levels of investment than using traditional innovations designed to innovate on 
the basis of more sophisticated products. Establishing joint innovation centres with clients 
therefore enable these Chinese companies to bring products to meet key demand of 
mainstream, mass-market consumers at lower prices than competitors. 
This analysis leads us to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: Establishing joint innovation centres with clients can facilitate disruptive 
innovation in China by understanding and satisfying customers' latent needs at lower prices.  
 
 Including customers as key members in the R&D team  
We also found that some leading Chinese firms such as Sany adopted a different 
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approach to understand customers' latent needs by adding customers as key members of their 
R&D team. Founded in 1986, Sany is a Chinese multinational heavy machinery 
manufacturing company headquartered in Changsha, Hunan Province. The company went 
public on the Shanghai Stock Exchange on July 3, 2003. Sany has acquired two German 
firms, Putzmeister and Intermix, and entered a joint venture with Palfinger of Austria. Now 
Sany has a dozen industrial sites in China plus manufacturing facilities in Brazil, Germany, 
India, Indonesia, and in the United States. By combining the technology know how obtained 
from western companies, the deep understanding of customers' needs, and low cost, Sany has 
disrupted the construction equipment industry. It is now the second largest heavy equipment 
manufacturer in the world, and the first company in its industry in China to enter the FT 
Global 500.  
A distinctive part of Sany's innovation processes is to invite major clients to become 
key members of their R&D team. As a product manager in Sany mentioned "since clients are 
using our products every day, they know best the pros and cons of our products". In the 
planning stage of a new product development, Sany join equipment operators, sales agents 
with R&D staff as a team to evaluate the product design and finalize new features. 
Furthermore, in the final stage of testing new products, it is their customers, not Sany, to 
approve and release new products.  
 XCMG - another leading Chinese construction equipment manufacturer, also applied 
the same approach to deeply understand customers' needs. XCMG is a multinational heavy 
machinery manufacturing company headquartered in Xuzhou, Jiangsu. It is a state-owned 
company and was founded in 1989, which is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In 1995 
XCMG formed a joint-venture with Caterpillar. In the same year, XCMG and Liebherr Group 
signed a licensing agreement allowing XCMG to manufacture three models of Liebherr all-
terrain cranes. Since then XCMG has achieved a rapid growth. In 2012 XCMG acquired a 
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majority stake in the privately owned German machinery manufacturer Schwing. In the same 
year the company began construction of a 16,400 square metre research and development 
facility in Krefeld, Germany. In 2014, it ranked fifth in world construction machinery 
industry. 
 XCMG often invite customers to join the R&D processes to find out customer's needs 
and develop new products meeting the specific needs of customers. One example is the 
popular EBZ200R hard rock tunnel-boring machine. Traditional excavation and tunnelling 
methods include blasting and shield tunnelling construction. Blasting is dangerous and often 
causes some degree of damage; while shield-tunnelling construction only suits for large-scale 
projects due to the initial installation of the device itself at very high cost. Some clients 
suggested XCMG to develop a boring machine to replace blasting or shield-tunnelling 
construction in order that they could reap these advantages. XCMG invited key customers to 
join their R&D team to improve the exiting model of boring machine and released the 
EBZ200R hard rock tunnel boring machine, which is made of high strength cutting head with 
optimized cutter arrangement. The EBZ200R hard rock tunnel-boring machine greatly 
enhanced the rock crushing performance and dramatically lowered the cost of digging and 
tunnelling compared with its competing products and solutions.   
Based on this observation from our case research, therefore, we advance the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 2: Including customers’ representatives as key members of the R&D team can 
facilitate disruptive innovation in China by helping to identify meeting latent customer needs 
and develop solutions at lower prices.  
 
Collaborating with customers in the R&D processes through Internet 
We observed that involving customers in the R&D processes through Internet was 
   
 
 
19 
another approach by Chinese firms to enable disruptive innovation. Taking the example of 
Xiaomi Technology, which is a privately owned Chinese electronics company headquartered 
in Beijing. The company was co-founded by eight partners on June 6, 2010, and it is now one 
of China's biggest electronics companies that designs, develops, and sells smartphones, 
mobile apps, and consumer electronics. Since the release of its first smartphone in August 
2011, Xiaomi has gained market share rapidly in mainland China. Xiaomi employs a business 
model that is very unlike other smartphone makers such as Samsung and Apple. The 
company does not own a single physical store and instead sells exclusively from its own 
online store. It also did away with traditional advertising and relies on social networking 
services as well as its own customers to help advertise its products. According to IDC, in 
2014 Xiaomi became the third largest smartphone maker in the world only after Samsung and 
Apple. 
The secret of Xiaomi's success is its capability to continually upgrade the operating 
system in its smartphones, enabling them to meet the needs of smartphone enthusiasts who 
are eager to enjoy the latest applications and potential new functionality. Traditional 
smartphones manufacturers do not upgrade the operating system often, while Xiaomi upgrade 
the operating system on average once every week - since August 2010 Xiaomi has released 
more than 100 new versions, which means two days for collecting the needs of customers, 
two days for development, and two days for testing and release. Xiaomi achieves that by 
involving key customers in the development processes. The company has established a social 
network for smartphone enthusiasts, and there are more than 2 hundred thousand active 
members. Those smartphone enthusiasts work with Xiaomi's R&D team to develop and test 
the latest version of operating system. As an R&D manager at Xiaomi related: "For a 
company, a R&D team usually consists of 200 to 300 engineers at most. But if you extend 
your R&D activities through the Internet, there will be hundreds of thousands people helping 
   
 
 
20 
you to design, development, and test your products for free." Furthermore, innovations 
suggested by customers themselves are more likely to meet their latent needs.  
Haier Group is a Chinese multinational consumer electronics and home appliances 
company headquarted in Qingdao, China. The company was founded in 1984 and is listed on 
both the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In 2014 research 
firm Euromonitor announced that Haier was the number one Global Major Appliances Brand 
in the world for the fifth consecutive year, increasing its global market share to 10.2%. One 
of the main reasons for Haier's success is that their products meet the specific needs of local 
customers. In order to understand precisely what customers want, Haier has launched 
"Internet Strategy" and established an Internet platform to involve customers in the whole 
R&D processes. Their award winning air conditioner "DiZun", for instance, was released by 
the continuous help of hundred thousands of members on the Internet platform, who involved 
in the R&D activities such as designing and providing feedback.  
We must emphasize that continuous upgrading can lead to disruptive innovation. A 
disruptive product often starts out as inferior in terms of overall performance compared with 
dominant designs, and can only serve niche segments that value its non-standard performance 
attributes. By continuously upgrading a product according to the customer's latent needs, it 
can evolve so as to become "good enough" in performance to satisfy mainstream customers 
by focusing solely on key attributes. Collaborating with customers in the R&D processes via 
Internet provides a way for continuous upgrading of a product. These findings lead us to posit 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: Involving customers in the R&D processes through Internet can facilitate 
disruptive innovation in China by meeting the customers' latent needs at lower prices.  
 
CONCLUSION 
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Existing research has explored the pre-conditions under which disruptive innovation 
is likely to arise within an organization. There has been much less investigation, however, of 
the nature of the customer-oriented processes that might facilitate disruptive innovation. At 
the same time, the literature has increasingly recognised that disruption can arise from 
innovation that is largely imitative in terms of base technology and functionality but is 
disruptive to incumbents because it introduces new value propositions and business models. 
A disruptive innovation often starts out as inferior in terms of the performance that existing 
customers expect. By incremental innovation according to the customer's latent needs, it can 
evolve so as to become "good enough" in performance to satisfy mainstream customers by 
focusing solely on key attributes. These types of disruptive innovation include cost 
innovation, application innovation, and business model innovation. Viewed through this lens, 
it is evident that a significant amount of disruptive innovation has been coming from Chinese 
firms in recent years. An analysis of the antecedents of this disruptive innovation from China, 
therefore, promised to shed light on how the customer-oriented processes adopted by a firm 
alter the probability of launching successful disruptive innovations. 
Based on multiple case studies of Chinese firms we found that their adoption of new 
or somewhat unconventional customer-oriented processes did seem to facilitate the 
realisation of various kinds of disruptive innovation. Specifically, establishing joint labs with 
customers, including customers as key members in the R&D team, and collaborating with 
customers via Internet, did all appear to underpin and facilitate disruptive innovation in our 
sample of firms. 
From a theoretical standpoint our results suggest that in understanding the antecedents 
of disruptive innovation it is not sufficient to explain the preconditions that create a 
favourable environment for disruptive innovation to emerge. These preconditions have been 
the focus of existing the literature, including: organizational culture; resource allocation 
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processes; organizational structure; and R&D and production processes. It is also important 
to model another important link in the logic chain: the customer-oriented processes firms 
choose to deeply understand the customers' latent needs and market conditions. 
Our results also extend the user innovation literature by examining how customer-
oriented processes can strengthen the link between users and prospective disruptors. The user 
innovation literature claims a direct link from interaction with customers and users to 
innovation performance. However the necessary knowledge flows promised by such a link 
may be shuttered when the contact with customers or users is through, for example, key 
account managers or the customer’s purchasing department, rather than directly with the 
innovation team. This warrants more in-depth examination of various customer-oriented 
processes. Our research suggests that customer-oriented processes such as establishing joint 
labs with customers, including customers as the key members in the R&D processes, and 
collaborating with customers via the Internet can strengthen the link between users and 
organizations. 
Our findings also have a number of managerial implications. First, they underline the 
need for managers to be alert to the importance role of mechanisms to promote high-quality 
customer interaction in promoting disruptive innovation. While incumbent firms may have 
the capabilities to develop advanced technologies, but it may not be easy for them to link 
their high technology products with the latent needs or the demands of potential new 
customers, because they often focus their investments on improving the established 
technologies used by their current customers. Customer-orientation is even more important 
for emerging companies whose resources are typically limited because it allows them to 
focus these limited resources on developing and improving key attributes of their offerings 
that fit with the latent needs of potential mass-market segments.   
Second, it also alerts managers to the complexities of achieving effective links 
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between users and their organizations. Understanding the latent customers' needs and finding 
the potential new growth markets requires reliable customer-oriented processes that enable 
rich flows of knowledge between the potential customer and supplier and joint discovery. 
These include establishing joint labs with customers, including  customers as key members of 
the R&D team, and collaborating with customers via the Internet for understanding how 
customers behave rather than simply how they say they will behave. 
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Table 1 
Overview of the Focal Firms 
Firm Founding Date Revenue (2013) Employees (2013) Number of Informants 
Interviewed 
Disruptive Impact 
Huawei 1987 $39 billion 150,000 5 (1) Founded in 1987 as a distributor of imported 
telecoms products 
(2) Now the largest telecommunications equipment 
maker in the world 
Kingdee  1993 $260 million 15,000 8 (1) Established in 1993 to develop accounting 
software 
(2) Now one of the largest ERP software suppliers 
in Chinese market, surpassing SAP and Oracle.  
SANY 1986 $15.3 billion 90,000 6 (1) Founded in 1986 as a material welding supplier 
(2) Now the world's second largest heavy machinery 
manufacturer 
XCMG 1989 $13.8 billion 78,000 5 (1) Founded in 1989 as Xugong Construction 
Machinery Science & Technology 
(2) Now the world's fifth largest heavy machinery 
manufacturer 
Xiaomi 
Technology 
2010 $12 billion 5000 6 (1) Founded in 2010 in Beijing 
(2) Now the world's 3rd largest smartphone 
distributor, after Apple and Samsung 
Haier 1984 $29.5 billion 70,000 9 (1) Founded in 1984 as Qingdao Refrigerator Co. 
(2) Now the world's largest company in white 
goods, with 10.2 per cent market share 
 
